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n issue that has captured considerable atten-
tion in corporate governance circles over the
past few years is the set of conditions that need to be
in place in order for a country’s corporate economy
to be dominated by publicly quoted companies with
widely dispersed shares. One line of enquiry gener-
ated by debates on the configuration of systems of
ownership and control concerns the impact of poli-
tics.Various observers,most prominently law profes-
sor Mark Roe, argue that it is impossible to get the
full story on corporate governance systems without
taking politics into account, in the sense that a coun-
try’s position on the ideological spectrum helps to
dictate how companies are governed (see Roe, 2001,
Roe, 2003, and Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005).
Thus far, there have been few empirical tests of the
proposition that politics affects corporate gover-
nance.To remedy this omission, we have conducted a
study focusing on the determinants of dividend policy
in publicly quoted British companies between 1949
and 2002.The study, the results of which are reported
in detail in the working paper, “Dividends and
Politics” (Bank, Cheffins and Goergen, 2006) finds
that political variables generally do not correlate in
the predicted direction with dividend pay-outs. This
implies politics does not shape corporate governance
in the manner Roe and others have hypothesized.
Politics as a Potential Determinant of Corporate
Governance
Why might politics be expected to matter with cor-
porate governance? Roe argues that left-wing coun-
tries favor employees over investors and corre-
spondingly use regulation to increase the leverage
workers possess.Corporate executives,in this milieu,
will tend to cater to employee preferences and give
shareholders short shrift, thus ensuring that a U.S.-
style stock market economy will not evolve.To elab-
orate,senior executives want to run big firms for rea-
sons of prestige and power but will tend to avoid
changes that might put the survival of their compa-
nies at risk since they have a massive amount of
human capital invested in the firms they run.As Roe
points out, this agenda tallies with the objectives of
incumbent employees since for staff “a steady as she
goes” ethos will foster job security and being associ-
ated with a large company can create numerous pro-
motion opportunities. Correspondingly, under
appropriate political conditions there is a foundation
for an alliance between managers and employees
that could leave shareholders out in the cold.A stock
market-driven system of corporate governance akin
to that existing in the United States,characterized by
companies with widely held shares, correspondingly
is unlikely to evolve in a left-wing country.
Roe’s conjectures can be readily applied to dividend
policy. His characterization of managerial prefer-
ences implies that corporate executives should pre-
fer to retain rather than distribute profits since cor-
porate growth can be fostered without unwelcome
scrutiny via capital markets. Also, executives appre-
hensive of a potential downturn in their company’s
fortunes will tend to be biased against dividends
since retained profits can help to provide a company
with the financial wherewithal to cope with adversi-
ty in the event of a “rainy day”.
Employees will tend to share management’s skepti-
cism towards dividends.With profits companies gen-
erate, workers may assume that cash paid out as div-
idends could have been distributed to staff in the
form of more generous wages and benefits.
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gen@sheffield.ac.uk.Employees might also support a conservative divi-
dend policy on the grounds that retained earnings
will provide their employers with a financial “cush-
ion” that will allow employment levels to be main-
tained in the face of unanticipated financial re-
versals.
Corporate finance theory implies shareholders
should be indifferent towards any managerial bias
against dividends, as exemplified by Miller and
Modigliani’s memorable claim that dividends are a
“mere detail” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).
Nevertheless,dividends have generally been popular
with shareholders, who have welcomed the cash as
means to finance their lifestyles. More generally div-
idends are a potentially integral element of corpo-
rate governance. For instance, when companies
make regular and continuous dividend payments,
this can curb the potentially counterproductive accu-
mulation of undistributed funds (referred to as “free
cash flow”in the finance literature) by managers and
can activate beneficial capital market discipline by
forcing companies to rely on external sources to
obtain needed funds. Also, unexpected changes to
dividend policy constitute potentially valuable sig-
nals under asymmetric information and dividend
cuts in particular can activate alternative corporate
governance mechanisms that address poor perfor-
mance or financial distress. This all implies that, to
the extent politics constitutes a determinant of cor-
porate governance, political variables will influence
the dividend policies companies adopt.
What sort of impact might politics be expected to
have? Again,according to Roe,in left-wing countries
employees are favored over shareholders and risk-
averse empire-building managers will be inclined the
same way. Since both managers and workers will be
skeptical of dividends, if politics “matters” to corpo-
rate governance,left-wing governments should corre-
late with low dividend payouts.Moves to the right on
the political front should, in turn, be associated with
the adoption of more generous dividend policies.
Why the United Kingdom?
In “Dividends and Politics”we test the impact of pol-
itics on dividend policy by using aggregate annual
data on dividends and earnings for the United
Kingdom between 1949 and 2002. One reason the
U.K. was a suitable choice was the availability of
detailed aggregate annual financial data covering
most publicly quoted companies as far back as 1949.
Another was that Britain’s political system is well-
suited for testing the impact that politics potentially
has on corporate governance. Unlike Continental
European political systems that often yield consen-
sus-oriented coalition governments, Britain’s
“Westminster Model”,characterized by the fusion of
the executive and the legislature and by majority
governments elected under a “first past the post”
electoral system, gives the party in control substan-
tial leeway to implement policies it prefers.
Neither of Britain’s major political parties (the
Conservatives and Labour) dominated exclusively
between 1949 and 2002,meaning that there was con-
siderable potential for significant shifts to the left
and right and back over time. Given this, and given
that there was no doubt at any moment in time
which party held political power, if there is a link
between politics and corporate governance, the
effects should be particularly pronounced for
Britain. Indeed, studying the U.K. in isolation
arguably constitutes a more robust test for politics’
impact on corporate governance than a cross-coun-
try study involving countries where coalition-orient-
ed government was the norm.
Modeling Dividends and Politics
Even if politics has an impact on dividends, corpo-
rate fundamentals will continue to play an important
role.As a result, we rely on Lintner’s “partial adjust-
ment” model of dividends (Lintner, 1956) in formu-
lating a model to test for a link between politics and
dividends. His work constitutes the foundation for a
well accepted consensus in the finance literature that
managers set dividend policy with targets based on
profitability in mind but only move partially towards
these over time.Managers engage in this sort of “div-
idend smoothing” because they anticipate cutting
existing dividends will be unpopular with sharehold-
ers, which means in turn they will only increase pay-
outs if current earnings projections imply a change is
likely to be sustainable over time.
Our paper supplements Lintner’s partial adjustment
model in various ways to test the impact of politics
on dividend policy. Following Fama and Babiak
(1968), we incorporated a lagged earnings variable,
with the logic being that managers take into account
earnings fluctuations occurring in prior years as well
as the current year in setting dividend policy. Our
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next step was to introduce a direct test of politics,
using a dataset that provides annual political rank-
ings for the U.K. (and other OECD countries) from
the end of World War II onwards based on the posi-
tion taken on 26 different social and economic issues
by the governing party in its party platform and on
the placement of the party in office based on views
adopted on 10 different market regulation and
wealth redistribution issues.
Even if the ideology of political parties in power is
not a determinant of dividend policy, politics and
dividends might still be related at one step removed.
As a result, we augment our basic political model
with “secondary” variables that have a strong politi-
cal aspect.Tax is one feature added,since in the U.K.
changes to corporate tax often have been accompa-
nied by political declarations of intent to dictate div-
idend policy. In recognition of the fact that institu-
tional shareholders largely displaced individual
investors as owners of corporate equity in the U.K.
between 1949 and 2002 and were taxed much differ-
ently than individuals, our paper draws upon
methodology developed by Poterba and Summers
(1985), and adapted by La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (2000), to construct for pension
funds and for top marginal rate taxpayers a tax pref-
erence ratio based on factors such as income tax
rates and the tax treatment of capital gains.
Generally,between 1949 and 2002 there was for indi-
viduals a strong tax bias in favor of retained earnings
and for pension funds, dividends.
Dividend controls, which were in place in the U.K.
throughout much of the late 1960s and the 1970s,
constitute a second variable added to the basic polit-
ical model. Winston Churchill’s denunciation, as
Conservative leader of the opposition,of a 1951 pro-
posal by the Labour government to introduce com-
pulsory regulation of dividends illustrates that such
controls could be politically controversial:
“To win the extreme section of the trade union leaders
to this policy, (the then Chancellor of the Exchequer)
proposed that dividends should…be frozen. Observe
that this was not done on the merits,but because much
of the driving power of the Socialist movement is
derived from the jealousy and envy of others who
think they are more fortunate than themselves.”
Therefore, if dividend controls cause cash distribu-
tions by companies to decline, this implies politics
affects dividends.
The power of organized labor is an additional sec-
ondary political factor built into our model. The
labor relations climate set by government can be
expected to affect the prosperity of unions.If unions,
in turn, are strong, this could have an impact on div-
idends since organized labor can potentially extract
“rents” available when companies generate above-
normal profits and thereby divert wealth from share-
holders to employees. The ebb and flow of union
bargaining power thus plausibly might be expected
to have an impact on dividend pay-outs.“Dividends
and Politics” uses two proxies for labor power, these
being annual fluctuations in “union density” (the
proportion of union members to the total working
population eligible to join a union) and annual
changes to labor costs in U.K.manufacturing compa-
nies, with the presumption being correlations
between increases in union density and/or labor
costs with falling dividend pay-outs, and vice versa,
would imply that politics influences dividend policy.
The basic political model is also supplemented by a
corporate law variable. La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny, in a 2000 study covering
46 countries,1 found companies from countries with
strong shareholder protection paid higher dividends
than companies from countries where investors were
poorly protected,which implies shareholder-friendly
laws enable minority shareholders to disgorge divi-
dend payments from corporate insiders. Corporate
law is also an appropriate addition to the model
because there is a potential political dimension (e.g.
labor leaders might object to the enactment of laws
designed to improve the protection of minority
shareholders, fearing that protecting jobs and secur-
ing favorable treatment for workers will be difficult
if management feels compelled to focus on the inter-
ests of profit-oriented investors). To take corporate
law into account, the paper identifies years when
major amendments were made to U.K.company leg-
islation to find out if these coincided with significant
changes to dividend policy.
Data on Dividends and Earnings
The dependent variable in our political model is the
annual change in aggregate gross dividends paid by
U.K.public companies,measured by reference to the
total for a given year minus the total for the previous
year. Two sources, a Cambridge/DTI Databank of
1 La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000).Company Accounts and Datastream, were used to
assimilate aggregate data for 1949 to 2002 and to col-
lect data on profits, which is a pivotal element of the
Lintner partial adjustment model. Dividends and
profits were adjusted to ensure that complications
arising from the U.K.’s system of corporate tax did
not corrupt the findings.
Results
“Dividends and Politics” finds the data fits well with
the Lintner model in its original apolitical form,indi-
cating the partial adjustment model explains well the
dividend pattern over time. Hence, U.K. public com-
panies set dividend policy annually by moving part
of the way toward a target payout ratio based on
earnings trends. Politics did little to disrupt this pat-
tern.While if politics “mattered”to corporate gover-
nance in the way that has been hypothesized divi-
dend pay-outs should have been higher when the
U.K. had a right-wing government and lower when
the government was on the left-wing of the political
spectrum, no meaningful statistical correlation was
found between the ideology of the party in power
and dividend policies of British public companies.
We ran as a robustness check a similar political test
for the United States focusing on the parties con-
trolling the Presidency and Congress and found
much the same outcome.
As for the variables designed to test the impact of
politics at one step removed, the results generally
confirm politics was not a determinant of dividend
policy.There was, for instance, no statistically signifi-
cant correlation between dividend pay-outs on the
one hand and dividend controls or company law on
the other. The outcome was the same with the tax
treatment of pension funds and with union density.
The paper does find a weak correlation in the pre-
dicted direction between dividend policy and the tax
treatment of top marginal tax rate taxpayers, in the
sense dividends tended to rise when tax laws became
biased in favor of distributed as opposed to retained
profits. The obvious way to interpret the result is to
say that companies set dividends with the tax treat-
ment of the top marginal tax rate taxpayer in mind.
This interpretation does not tally, however, with his-
torical patterns. Over time the correlation should
have weakened since the percentage of shares
owned by individuals was declining steadily and
companies logically should have been worrying less
and less about their tax status. Instead, the correla-
tion remained much the same throughout the entire
period under study.
The other statistically significant correlation involves
labor costs. Again, however, the results do not pro-
vide strong support for the proposition that politics
constituted a determinant of dividends.If politics was
a determinant of dividends, labor costs should rise
under left-wing governments, which in turn should
depress dividends. In fact, the converse was found,
namely that dividends actually rose in tandem with
labor costs and vice versa.There is no obvious politi-
cal explanation for this pattern, which implies that
there is not a political story to be told here.
Conclusion
The theory that politics is a key determinant of cor-
porate governance has a plausible ring to it.
Certainly, in countries suffering from political
repression and related civil strife, the economic and
institutional pre-conditions for the development of
large, privately-owned enterprises may well remain
unsatisfied. Even in rich, stable democracies, politics
stands out as a potential determinant of corporate
governance since social democratic policies might
exacerbate agency costs by fostering an identity of
interest between corporate insiders and rank-and-
file employees.
Our results indicate that in the particular context of
dividend policy in the U.K.politics did not shape cor-
porate governance.The only robust statistical finding
is that British public companies set dividend policy
in accordance with a model well accepted in the eco-
nomic literature, namely by adjusting over time
towards a target based upon corporate earnings.
Politics, it appears, failed to dislodge the pattern in a
readily measurable way, even though dividend con-
trols and tax rules biased against dividends were in
place at various points during the period studied.
Bearing these results in mind,one might wonder why
managers of U.K. companies “kept their eye on the
ball”and continued to pay dividends by reference to
targets based on earnings, particularly given the
politically oriented constraints on dividend policy. It
is possible the threat of a takeover bid could have
played a role, since companies that adopted a divi-
dend policy that displeased shareholders should
have traded at a discount and thus would have been
CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 36
ForumCESifo DICE Report 1/2007 37
Forum
vulnerable to an unwelcome tender offer.To test this
conjecture, we compiled data on the number of
mergers carried out in the U.K. annually from 1949
to 2002 and ran their regressions again to see if there
was a correlation between takeover activity and div-
idend pay-outs.Contrary to what would be expected,
the coefficient was negative. There is no obvious
explanation for this result,but the fact that we had to
rely on data based on all mergers, rather than just
hostile takeovers, might have played a role.
While it is unclear why U.K. public companies con-
tinued to set dividend policy by reference to earn-
ings, the paper’s results nevertheless do show that in
this particular context politics was not a determinant
of corporate governance. Further research involving
different proxies for corporate governance and dif-
ferent countries will be required to establish whether
this finding reflects a more general pattern.
However,since the conditions in the U.K.were high-
ly congenial to a finding that politics influenced div-
idend policy,politics only seems likely to be found to
be a determinant of corporate governance under
extreme circumstances.
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